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1. The Sources of the Latest Turn.

turns, even wide ones, are absolutely unavoidable in our epoch. They are necessitated by
the abrupt turns of the objective situation (the lack
of stable international relations; sharp and irregular fluctuations of conjuncture ; sharp reflections
of the economic fluctuations in politics; the impulsiveness of the masses under the influence of the feeling of helples ness, etc. etc.) . Attentive watchfulness over the changes in. the objective situation is
now far more important and at the same time an immeasurably more difficult task than prior to the
war, in the epoch of the "organic" development of
capitalism. The leadership of the Party now finds
itself in the position of a chau:ffeur who drives his
automobile on a mountain, over the sharp zig-zags
of the road. An untimely turn, incorrectly applied

TACTICAL
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apeedt threaten the paasengers and the car with the
greatest danger, if not with destruction.
The leadership of the Communist International ha given us example in recent years of very
abrupt turns. The latest of them we observe these
last months. What has called forth the turns of the
Communist International ince the death of Lenin?
The changes- in the objective situation? No. It can
be said with confidence: beginning with 1923, there
was not a single tactical tum made in time by the
Comintern under the influence of correctly estimated
changes in the objective conditions. On the contrary : every turn was the result of the unbearable
sharpening of the contradictions between the line
of the Comintern and the objective situation. We
are witnessing the very same thing this time, too.
The Ninth Plenum of the E. C. C. I., the
Six.th Congress, and particularly the Tenth Plenum,
adopted a course towards an abrupt and direct revolutionary rise (the "third period"), which was absolutely excluded at the time by the objective situa.tion w ting after the greatest defeats in England and China, the weakening of the Communist
Parties throughout the world, and particularly under the condition of a commercial and indu trial ascent which embraced a eries of the mo t important
capitali t countrie . The tactical turn in the Communist International beginning with F bruary 1928,
was therefore dir ctly contrary to the actual turn
of the historic road. From the e contradictions
aro e : the tendencies of adventurism, the further
isolation of the Partie from the masses, the weakening of the organizations, etc. Only after all these
phenomena had clearly assumed a menacing character did the leadership of the Comintern make a new
turn in February 1980, backward from, and to the
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Right of, the tactics of the "third period".
It is the irony of fate, unmerciful to all
chvostism•, that the new tactical turn .in the Comintern coincided chronologically with the new turn
in the objective conditions. An international crisis
of unpr cedented a.cuteness undoubtedly opens perspectives for the radicalization of the masses and
social convulsions.
Precisely under such circumstances, a turn to the Left could and should have
been made, that is, to adopt a bold speed on the
path of revolutionary rise. This would have been
absolutely correct and necessary if, in the last three
years, the leadership of the Comintern had utilized
as it should have the period of economic revival and
the revolutionary ebb to strengthen the positions
of the Party in the mass organizations, above all in
the trade unions. Under such circumstances, the
chauffeur could and should have shifted his gears in
1930 from second into third speed, or at least prepared for such a change in the nearest future. In
reality the directly oppo ite process took place. So
as not to go over the cliff, the chauffeur had to
change from the prematurely adopted speed to the
econd, and to slow down the pace. When? Under
circumstances which, with the correct strategical
line, would have made neces ary its acceleration.
Such is the crying contra.diction between the tactical nece ity and strategical perspective, a contradiction in which, by the logic of the mistakes of their
leadership the Communist Parties find themselves
in a number of countrie .
We see this contradiction mo t strikingly
and dangerou ly now in Germany, where the last
•Literally, "tall-Ism' ' that is, the theory or practise of
at the tau of event.a.

follow~g
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elections revealed an exceptionally peculiar relation
of forces, resulting not only from the two periods
of Germany's post-war stabilization, but also from
the three periods of the Comintern's mistakes.

2. T h e P a r I i a m e n t a r y V i c t o r y o f
the Communist Party in the Light
o f t h e R e v o I 11 t i o n a r y T a s k s.
The official press of the Comintern is now depicting the results of the German elections as a prodigious victory of Communism, :which places on the
order of the day the slogan of a Soviet Germany.
The bureaucratic optimists do not want to reflect
upon the meaning of the relation of forces which is
disclosed by the election statistics. They examine
the figure of the Communi t vote gained independently of the revolutionary task created by the
situation and the obstacle it sets up. The Communist Party received around 4,600,000 votes as
against 8,800,000 in 1928. Fr>dm the viewpoint
of ''normal" parliamentary mechanics, the gain of
1,800,000 votes i considerable even if we take into
consideration the ri e in the total number of voters.
Dut the gain of the Party pales completely beside
the leap of Fascism from 800,000 to 6,400,000
votes. Of no less important signiDcance for evaluating the elections is the fact that the social democracy, in spite of substantial losses, retained its
basic cadres and till received a considerably greater number of workers' votes than the Communist
Party.
Meanwhile, if we should ask ourselves, What
combination of international and domestic circumstances could be capable of turning the working
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class towards Communi m with greater velocity? we
could not find an example of more favorable circumstances for such a turn than the situat~on in
present-day Germany: Young's noose, the economic
crisis, the disintegration of the ruler , the crisi of
parliamentarism, the terrific self-exposure of the
social democracy in power. From the viewpoint of
these concrete historical circumstances, the specific
gravity of the German Communist Party in the
social life of the country, in spite of the gain of
1,300,000 votes, remains proportionately small.
The weakne s of the po itions of Communism, inextricably bound up with the policy and
regime of the Comintern, is revealed more clearly if
we compare the present social weight of the Communist Party with those concrete and unpo tponable ta ks which the present historical circumtance put before it.
It i true that the Communist Party itself
did not expect such a gain. But this proves that
under the blows of mi takes and defeats, the leader•
ship of the Communi t Parties has become disaccu tomed from big aim and perspectives. If ye terday it underestimated its own possibilities, then
today it once more undere timates the difficulties.
In this way, one danger i multiplied by another.
In the meantime, the first characteristic of
a real revolutionary Party-is to be able to look
reality in the face.
8. T h e V a c i 11 a t i o n s o f t h e B i g
Bourgeoisie.

With every turn of the historic road, with
every social crisis, we mu t over and over again ex-
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amine the question of the mutual relationa of the
three classes in modern society: the big bourgeoi-

sie, led by finance capital; the petty bourgeoise,
vacillating between the basic camps; and finally, the
proletariat.
The big bourgeoisie, making up a negligible
part of the nation, cannot .hold power without the
support of the petty bourgeoisie of the city and the
village, that is, of the remnants of the old, and the
mas es of the new, middle classes. In the present
epoch, this support acquires two basic forms politically antagonistic to each other but historically
supplementary: social democracy and Fascism.
In the person of the social democracy, the petty
bourgeoise, which follows finance capital, leads behind it millions of workers.
The big German. bourgeoiaie is vacillating
at present ; it is split up, Its disagreements are exhausted by the question: Whlch of the two methods
of cure for the socia) crisis shall be applied at
pre ent? The social democratic therapy repels
one part of the big bourgeoisie with the indefiniteness of its results, and with the danger of too great
levie (taxes, social legislation, wage ) . The surgical intervention of Fascism seems to the other part
to be uncalled for by the situation and too risky.
In other words, the finance bourgeoisie as a whole
vacillates in the evaluation of the situation, not seeing sufficient basis as yet for the proclamation of an
offensive of its own ''third period", when the social
democracy is unconditionally replaced by .Fascism,
when, generally speaking, it undergoes a general annihilation for its services rendered. The vacillations
of the big bourgeoisie-with a weakening of .its basic
parties-between the social democracy and Fascism
are an extraordinarily clear symptom of a pre-rev-
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olutionary situation. With the approach of the
real revolutionary situation, these vacillations, it ia
understood, will come to an end immediately.
4. T h e P e t t y B o u r g e o i s i e
a n d F a s c i s m.

In order that the social crisis may bring
about the proletarian revolution, it is necessary
that, besides other conditions, a decisive shift of the
petty bourgeois classes occurs in the direction of
the proletariat.
This gives the proletariat &
chance to put itself at the head of the nation as its
leader.
The last election revealed-and this is where
its principal symptomatic significance lies-a shift
in the opposite direction. Under the blow of the
crisis, the petty bourgeoisie swung, not in the
direction of the proletarian revolution, but in the
direction of the most extreme imperialist reaction,
pulling behind it considerable sections of the proletariat.
The gigantic growth of national-socialism
is an ex.pre sion of two factors : a deep social crisis,
throwing the petty bourgeois masses off balance,
and the lack of a revolutionary Party that would
be regarded by the masses of the people as an acknowledged revolutionary leader. If the Communist
Party is the Party of reoolu.ti<ni.ary hope, then Fascism, a a mass movement, is the party of counterreooZuticmary <le1pair. When revolutionary hope
embraces the whole proletarian mass, it inevitably
pulls behind it on the road of revolution considerable and growing sections of the petty bourgeoise.
Precisely in the sphere, the election revealed the
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opposite picture: counter-revolutionary de pair embraced the petty bourgeoi ma s with uch a
force that it drew behind it many sections of the
proletariat.
How i this to be expla.in.ed? In the past,
we have observed (Ital , Germany) a sharp
trengthening of Fascism, victorious or at least
threatening, as a re ult of a spent or missed revolutionary situation, at the conclusion of a revolutionary crisis in which the proletarian vanguard revealed its inability to put itself at the head of the nation
and change the fate of all its cla es, the petty
bourg oi e included. This is precisely ' hat gave
Fa cism its peculiar strength in Italy. But at present, the problem in Germany does not arise at the
conclusion of a revolutionary crisis but only at its
approach. From this, the leading Party official ,
optimi ts ex-officio, draw the conclusion that Fa ci m, having come "too late", is doomed to inevitable
and speedy defeat (RoTE FA.HNE). These people
do not want to learn anything. Fascism comes "too
late" in relation to old revolutionary crises. But it
appear sufficiently early-at the dawn- in relation
to the new revolutionary crisis. The fact that it
gained the po ibility to take up such a powerful
starting position on the eve of a revolutionary
period and not at its conclusion, is not the weak
side of Fascism but the weak side of Communism.
The petty bourgeoi i does not wait- as a consequence of new disappointments in the ability of the
Party to improve its fate-it ba es itself upon the
experiences of the past, it remembers the les on of
1923, the capricious leaps of the ultra-Left course
of Maslow-Thiilmann, the opportunist impotence of
the same Thalmann, the clatter of the "third
period", etc. Finally-and this is the most imporl-
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ant-it lack of faith in the proletarian revolution
is nourished by the lack of faith in the Communist
Party on the part of millions of social democratic
workers. The petty bourgeoisie, even when completely thrown off the conservative roa-0 by circumstance , clln turn to the social revolution only when
the sympathies of the majority of the working class
are for the social revolution. Precisely this most
important condition is still lacking in Germany,
and not by accident.
The programmatic declaration of the German Communist Party before the elections was completely and exclusively devoted to Fascism as the
main enemy. Neverthele s, Fasci m came out the
victor, gathering not only millions of semi-proletarian elements, but also many hundreds of thousand of industrial workers. This is an expression
of the fact that in spite of the parliamentary victory of the Communist Party, the proletarian revolution as a whole su.ffered a serious defeat in this
election, it is understood, of a preliminary, warning,
a d not decisive character. It can become decisive
and will inevitably become decisive, if the Communist
Party is unable to evaluate its partial parliamentary victory in connection with this "preliminary''
character of the defeat of the revolution as a whole,
and draw from this all the nec~ssary conclusions.
Fa1ci1m in Germany ha1 become a real danger, as an acute expression of the helpless position
of the bourgeois regime, the conservative role of
the social democracy in this regime, and the accumulated powerlessness of the Communist Party
to abolish it. Whoever denies this is either blind or
a braggart.
In 1923, Brandler, in spite of all our warnm , monstrously exaggerated the forces of Fascism.
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From the wrong evaluation of the relationship of
forces grew a hesitating, evasive, defensive, cowardly policy. Thi destroyed the revolution. Such
events do not pa without leaving traces in the
consciousne of all the classes of the nation. The
overestimation of Fa cism by the Communist leadership created one of the conditions for its further
strengthening. The contrary mi take, this very underestimation of Fa cism by the pre ent leadership of the Communist Party, may lead the revolution to a more severe era h for many year to come.
The danger acquire particular acutenes
in connection with the que tion of the te?npo of development, which doe not depend upon us alone.
The malarial character of the political curve revealed by the election speaks for the fa.ct that the
tempo of development of the national crisi may
turn out to be very speedy. In other words, the
course of events in the very near future may resurrect in Germany on a new historical plane, the old
tragic contradiction between the maturity of a revolutionary situation, on the one hand, and the eakness and strategical impotence of the revolutionary
Party on the other. This mu t be said clearly, openly, and above all, in time.
5. T h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y a n d t h e
Working Class.
It ould be a monstrous mistake to console
oneself with the fact, for instance, that the Bolshevik
Party in April 1917, after the arrival of Lenin,
when the Party first began to prepare for the
seizure of power, had le s ~han 80,000 members and
led behind itself, even in Petrograd, not more than
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a third of the workers and a far smaller part of
the soldiers. The situation in Russia was altogether
different. The revolutionary Partie came out of
the underground only in March, after an almost
three year interruption of even that strangled political life which exi ted prior to the war. The working class during the war renewed itself approximately forty percent. The overwhelming mass of
the proletariat did not know the Bolsheviks, he.d
not even heard of them. The voting for the Mensheviks and S. R.'s in March-June wa11 simply an
expression of the first hesitating steps after the
awakening. In this voting there was not even a
shadow of disappointment with the Bol heviks or
accumulated lack of faith in them, which may result from the mistakes of the Party, checked up
by the experience of the masses. On the contrary.
Every day of revolutionary experience in 1917
pushed the masses away from the conciliators and
to the side of the Bolshevik . From thi followed
the stormy, inexorable growth of the ranks of the
Party, and particularly of its inftuence.
The ituation in Germany ha at its root
a different character, in this respect as well as in
others. The German Communi t Party did not come
upon the scene yesterday, nor the day before. In
1928, it had behind it, openly or in a semi-concealed
form, the majority of the working class. In 1924,
on the ebbing wan, it received 3,600,000 votes, a
greater percentage of the working class than at
present. This meana that those workers who remained with the social democracy, as well as those who
voted this time for the National Socialists, did so
not out of simple ignorance, not because they &wakened only yesterday, not because they have as yet
had no chance to know what the Communi t Party
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is, but because they have no faith., on the basis of
their own experience in the recent years.
Let us not forget that in February 1928,
the Ninth Plenum of the E:x:ecutive Committee of
the Comintern gave the signal for an intensified,
extraordinary, irreconcilable struggle again t " ocial Fascism." The German ocial democracy was
in power almost all this time, revealing to the masses
at every step it criminal and shameful role. And
all this wa supplemented by an enormous economic
crisis. It would be difficult to invent circum tance
more favorable for the weakening of the social democracy. Neverthele s, it retained it basic position . How is tbi stn1cing fact to be explained?
Only by the fact that the leader hip of the Communi t Party, by its whole policy, a i ted the social
democracy supporting it from the L ft.
This does not at all mean that by voting
for the social democracy, five to six million working men and women expre sed their full and unlimited confidence in it. The social demo~ratic workers
should not be consid red blin . They are not at
all o naive about their own leader , but they do
not see a different way out for them elves in the
gi en situation. Of cour e, we a.re not speaking of
the labor aristocracy and bu eaucracy, but of the
rank and file worker . The policy of the Communist
Party doe not inspire them with confidence, not
because the Communi t Party i a revolutionary
Party but becau e they do not believe in its ability
to gain a revolutionary victory, and do not wish
to risk their heads in vain. Voting reluctantly for
the social democracy, these workers do not e:x:press
confidence in it, but for that they expre their
~ack of confidence in the Communist Party. This
is where the great difference lie between the pre-
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sent position of the German Communists and the
position of the Rus11ian BolsheTiks in 1917.
But by this alone, the difficulties are not
exhausted: Inside the Communist Party itself, and
particularly in the circle of its supporters and the
workers voting for it, is a great reserve of vague
lack of faith in the leadership of the Party. From
thi grows what is called the "disparity" between
the general influence of the Party and it numerical strength, and particularly with it role :in the
trade unions- in Germany such a disparity undoubtedly e.x:i ts. The official expla.n.ation of the
di parity is that the Party has not b en able to
"strengthen" its influence organizationally. Here
the mass is looked upon as purely passive material,
which nters or does not enter the Party, depending exclusively upon whether the secretary can grab
every worker by the throat. The bureaucrat does
not understand that workers have their own mind,
their experience, their will, and therr active or pa ive policy toward the Party. The worker votea
for the Party- for its banner, for the October revolution, for his own future revolution. But by refusing to join the Communist Party or to follow
it in the trade union struggle, he says that he has
no faith in its daily policy. The "disparity" is
consequently, in the final analysis, an expression
of the lack of confidence of the mas es in the present
leadership of the Communist International. And
this lack of confidence c eated and strengthened by
mistakes, defeats, fictions and direct deception of
the masses from 1928 to 1930, is one of the greateat
hindrances on the road to the victory of the proletarian revolution.
Without an internal confidence in itself, the
Party will not conquer the class. Not to conquer
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the proletariat means not to break the petty bourgeois masses away from Fascism. One is inextricably bound up with the other.

6. B a c k t o t h e ' ' S e c o n d ' ' P e r i o d o r
Once More Towards the "Third"?
If we were to use the official term_inology
of Centrism, we would formulate the problem in the
following form : The leadership of the Comintern
foisted the tactic of the "third period" upon the
national sections, that is, the tactic of an immediate
revolutionary upsurge at a time (1928) when the
feature of the "second period" were most clearly
visible, that is, the stabilization of the bourgeoisie and the ebb and decline of the revolution.
The turn from this, which came in 1930, meant a
rejection of the tactic of the "third period" in favor
of the tactic of the "second period". In the meantime, this turn made its way through the bureaucratic apparatus at a moment when the most important symptom began at any rate in Germany,
to ignalize plainly th rea.l approach of a "th'rd
period." Does the need for a new tactical turn Bow
from all this-in the direction of the recently abaudoned tactic of the "third period"?
We use these designations so as to make the
posing of this problem more accessible to those
circles whose minds are clogged up by the methodology and terminology of the Centrist bureaucracy.
But we have no intention whatever to adopt thia
terminology, which conceals a combination of Stalinist burea.ucratism and Bucharinist metaphysics. We reject the apocalyptic presentation of the
"third" period as the final one: How many periodt
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there will be before the victory of the proletariat
is a question of the relation of forces and the changes
in the situation; all this can be tested only through
action. We reject the very essence of this strategic schematicism with its numbered period.w; there
is no abstract tactic established in advance for
the "second" and the ''third" periods. It is understood that we cannot ~chieve victory and the seizure of power without an armed uprising. But how
shall we reach this uprising? By what methods?
And at what tempo shall we mobilize the masses?
This depends not only upon the objective situation in general, but in the first place, upon the
state in which the arrival of the social crisis in the
country finds the proletariat, upon the relation
between the Party and the classt the proletariat
and the petty bourgeoisie, etc. The state of the
proletariat at the threshhold of the "third period"
depends in its turn upon the tactic the Party applied in the period preceding it.
The normal, natural change of tactics, with
the present turn of the situation in Germany, should
have b en the acce'teration of tempo, the sharpening of alogana and methods of 1troggle. This tactical turn would have been normal and natural
only if the tempo and slogans of struggle of ye11terday had corresponded to the conditions of the
preceding period. But this never occurred. The
sharp discordance of the ultra-Left policy and the
stabilized situation is precisely the reason for the
tactical tUl'n. What ha.s resulted is that at the
moment when the new turn of the objective situation, along with the unfavorable general regrouping of the political forces, brought Communism a big gain of votes, the Party turns out to
be strategically and tactically more disorientated,
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entangled, and off the track than ever before.
To make clearer the contradiction fallen
info by the German Communi t Party, like most
of the other sections of the Comintern, only far
deeper than the rest of them let tis take the simplest compari on. In order to j WDE over a barrier, a preliminary running start i necessary. The
higher the barrier, the more important it is to
start the run on time, not too late and not too
early, in order to approach the ob truction with the
n ce sary reserve of strength. Beginning with February 1928, and esp cially since July 1929, howver, the German Communist Party did nothing
but take the running start. It is no wonder that
the Party began to lo e its wind and drag it feet.
The Comintern finally gave the command : " ingle
quick time!" But no sooner had the winded Party
sta1·ted to change to a more normal step, than before it began to appear not an imaginary but an
a.ctual barrier w]uch might require a revolutionary
jump.
there be enough distance for taking
the run? Shall the turn be rejected and. changed
to a counter-turn? These are the tactical and
st:qitegic que tions which appear before tht: German Party in all their acutene s.
In order that the leading cadres of the Party
hould be able to find a correct reply to the e que tions they must have th chance to judge the clo e t
section of the road in connection with the strategy
of the pa t years and its con equences, a revealed
in thi election. If in opposition to this, the bureaucracy should succeed, by cries of victory, to drown
the voice of political self-criticism, th.is would inevitably lead the prol tariat to a catastrophe
more terrible than that of 1923.
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7. The

Possible Variations of the
Further Development.

A revolutionary situation, confronting the
proletariat with the immediate problem of seizing
power, is made up of objective and subjective elements, each bound with the other, and to a large
extent, conditioning each other. But this mutual
dependence is relative The law of uneven development applies fully al o to the factors of a revolutionary situation. An insufficient development of
one of them may produce a condition in wl1i.ch the
revolutionary situation either does not come to an
explosion and spends itself, or coming to an explosion, ends in defeat for the revolutionary working class. What is the situation in Germany in this
respect?
1. A deep national crisis (economy, international situation) is unquestionably at hand.
There appears to be no way out along the normal
road of the bourg oi parliamentar regime.
2. The political crisis of the ruling class
and its s stem of government is absolutel:y indubitable. This is not a parliamentary crisis, but a
~risis of clas rule.
3. The revolutionary cla
however is
still deeply split by internal contradictions. The
strengthening of the revolutionary Party at the
expense of the reformists is as yet at its inception,
and has been proceeding thus far at a tempo which
is far from corresponding with the depth of the
crisis.
4. The petty bourgeoisie, at the very beginning of the crisis, has already assumed a position antagonistic to the preaent aya~em of capitalist
rule, but at the a.me time mortally hostile to the
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proletarian revolution.
In other words: there are at hand the basic
objective conditions for a proletarian revolution;
there is one of it political conditions (the state of
the ruling cla s) ; the other political condition (the
t te of the proletariat) ha fir t begun to change
in the direction of revolution, and 6 cau e of f.he
heritage of the past, cannot change rapidly; finally, the third political condition (the state of the
petty bourgeoi ie) is not directed towards the proletarian revolution but toward a bourgeois counter-revolution.
The chang of thi la t condition
into a favorable one cannot be accomplished without radical changes in the proletariat it elf, that
is, without the political liquidation of the social
democracy.
We have, thus, a deeply contradictory situation. Some of its factors put the proletarian
revolution on the order of the day: others, however, exclude the po ibility of its victory in the
next pe'riod, that is, without a previous deep change
in the polit.ical relation of force .
Theoretically, everal variations of the further development of the present situation in Germany can be considered, depending upon objective
factors, the policy of the cla s enemies included,
a well as the conduct of the Communist Party
itself. Let us note chematically four po ible variations of development.
1. The CQJDJDwrist Party, frightened by
its own strategy of the "third period", moves
ahead gropingly, with extreme caution, avoiding
ri ky steps and-without giving battle, misses a
revolutionary situation. This would mean a repetition of the policy of Brandler in 1921-1923,
only changed in form. Re:B.ecting the pressure of the
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social democracy, the Brandlerists and semi-Brandlerists, outside the Party as well as inside of it,
will drive in this direction.
2. Under the influence of the election succes , the Party, on the contrary, makes a new sharp
turn to the Left, in the direction of a direct struggle for power, and being a arty of the active minority, suffers a cata trophic defeat. Driving in this
direction are: Fascism; the clamorous, senseless
agitation of the apparatus which doe not weigh
anything, which does not enlighten, but stupefies ;
the despair and impatience of a part of the working
class, particularly the unemployed youth.
a. It is further possible that the leadership, rejecting nothing, will attempt empirically
to find a middle course between the dangers of the
first two variation.s,and in this connection, will commit a series of new mistakes and, in general, will
so slowly elim,inate the lack of confide.nee of the
proletarian and emi-proletarian masse , that by
that time the objective conditions will have changed in a direction unfavorable for a revolution, giving way to a new period of stabilization. It is
chiefly in this celectic direction, combining chvoBtiam in general with adventurism in particular, that
the Moscow Stalinist top is pushing the German
Party, fearing to take a clear position and preparing an alibi for itself beforehand, that is, the
possibility to throw responsibility over to the "executor "- at the Right or at the Left, depending
upon the results. This policy, with which we are
familiar enou~, sacrifices the international-historical interests oi the proletariat to the interests
of the ''presti " of the bureaucratic top, Intimations of such a course are alrea.dy given in PRAVDA
of September 16.
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4. Finally, the most propitiou , or more
correctly, the only propitious variation: the German Party, through the effort of its be t and
most conscious element , take a careful survey of
the whole pre ent contradictory situation. .By a
correct, audacious and flexible policy, the Party,
on the basis of the present situ~tion, till ucceeds
to unite the majority of the proletariat and to
secure a change of front of the semi-proletarian
and mo t oppressed petty bourgeois ma e . The
proletarian vanguard, as the leader of the nation
of the toilng and oppre sed comes to victory.
To help the Party change it policy towards this
course is the ta k of the .Bolshevik-Leninist (Left
Opposition).
It would be fruitless to guess which of these
variations has more chances to happen in the n t
period. Such questioDB are not decided by gue ses
but by struggle.
One of its necessary elements is an irreconcilable ideological truggle against the Centrist
leadership of the Com.intern. From Moscow, the
signal has already been given for a policy of bureaucratic prestige which covers up the mistakes
of ye terday and prepares tomorrow' by the false
cries about the new triumph of the line. Monstrously exaggerating the victory of the Party, monstrou ly underestimating the difficulties, interpreting even the succe of Fa ci m a a positive factor
for the proletarian revolution, PRAVDA nevertheless explains b,riefiy: "The successes of the Party
should not make us dizzy." The treacherou.s policy
of the Stalinist leadership is true to itself even here.
The analysis of the situation is given in the spirit
of uncritical ultra-Leftism. In thi way the Party
i consciously pushed on the road of adventurism.
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At the same time, Stalin prepares his alibi in advance with the aid of the ritualistic phrase about
"dizziness". It is precisely this policy, short-sighted, unscrupulous, that may ruin the German revolution.

8. W h e r e i s t h e W a y

0 ut ?

We have given above, without any glossing
over or embellishment, an analysis of the difficulties and dangers which are related fully to the political and subjective sphere, which grew primarily
out of the mistakes and crimes of the epigone leadership, and which now definitely threaten to demoli h a new revolutionary situation developing before
our ery eyes. The officials will either close their
eye to our analysi or else they will replenish their
stock of slander. But it is not a matter of hopeless official ; it concerns the fate of the German
proletariat. In the Party, as well as in the apparatus, there are not a few people who observe and
think, and who will be compelled tomorrow by sharp
circumstances to think with doubled intensity. It
~s to them we direct our analysis and our conclusions.
Every critical ituation has great sources
of indefinitene . Moods, views and forces, ho tile
and friendly, are formed ;in the very process of the
crisis. They cannot be foreseen mathematically.
They must be measured in the process of the struggle, through struggle and on the basis of the e living measurement , necessary corrections must be
made in the policy.
Can the strength of the conservative resistance of the social democratic workers be calculated
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before.band? It cannot. In the light of the events
of the past year, this strength seems to be gigantic.
But the truth is that what helped most of all to weld
together social democracy was the wrong policy of
the Communist Party, which found its highest generalization in the absurd theory of social Fasci m.
To measure the real resistance of the social democratic rank , a diff'erent measuring instrument is
required, that is, a correct Communist tactic. With
this condition-and it is not
small conditionthe degree of internal unity of the social democracy
can be revealed in a comparatively brief period.
In a different form, what has been said above
also applies to Fascism: It emanated, aside from
the other conditions present, in the tremblings of
the Zinoviev-Stalin striategy. What is its fo:rce
for offensive? What is its stability? Has it reached it culminating point, as the outimists ex-officio
a sure us, or is it only on the first step of the ladder? This cannot be foretold mechanically. It can
be . determine.d only. through action. Precisely in
regard to Fascism, which is a. razor in the ban
of the class enemy, the wrong policy of the Comintern may produce fatal results in a brief period.
On the other hand, a correct policy-not in uch a.
short period, it is true---ean undermine the positions of Fascillm.
A revolutionary Party, at the time of a
crisis in the r~gime, is much honger in the extraparliamentary ma s struggles than within the
framework of parlirunentarism.
Again, on only
one condition: if it can conectly estimate the situation and connect in practise the living needs of the
masses with the task of seizing power. Everything
is now reduced to this. It would therefore be the
greatest mistake to see in the present situation in
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Germany only dllliculties and dangers. No. The
situation also reveals tremendous possibilities, providing it is clearly and thoroughly understood and
correctly utilized.
What is needed for this?
1. A forced turn to the "Right" at a time
when the circumstances turn ''Leftward", demands
a particularly attentive, scrupulous and cape.hie
viewing of the further changes of all the factors
in the situation.
The abstract contrasting of the meth·ods of
the second and third periods must be immediately
rejected. The ituation must be taken a it is,
with all its contradictions and the live dynamics of
its development. We mu t keep vigilantly abreast
of the real changes in the situation and influence
it in the direction of its real development, and not
to fit into the patterns of Molotov and Kuu inen.
To be orientated in the situation-is the
mo t important and most difficult part of the ta k.
By the btireaucratic methods, it cannot be solved
at all. Statistics, important though they are by
thems el es, are insufficient for this purpose. It is
necessary to sound the very deepe t ma s of the
proletariat and the toilers in general.
Not only
mu t live and attractive slogam be advanced but
we must trace the hold they get on the mas ea.
This can be achieved only by an active Party which
puts out tens of thousand of feelers everywhere,
which gathers their testimony, considers all the
question and actively works out its collective viewpoint.
2. The question of the Party regime is inextricably bound up with this. People appointed
by Moscow, independent of the confidence or lack
of confidence of the Party, will not be able to
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lead the masses in an as a.ult upon capitalist society. The more artificial the present regime, the
deeper will be its cri i in the days and hours of
decision. Of all the "turns," the most important
and urgent one applie to the Party ~gime. It is
a question of life and death.
8. The change in the regime is the precondition for a change in the course, and together
with it, its consequences.
One is inconceivable
without the other. The Party must break away
from the atmosphe1·e of deceit, re ervations, silence
over real calamitie , the praising of spurious values
-in a word, from the disastrous ntmo phere of
Stalinism, which i not created by ~Jeological and
political influence but by the crude, material dependence of the apparatus and the methods of commanding based upon it. One of the necessary conditions
for the liberation of the Party from bureaucratic
bondage is a general examination of the "general
line" of the German lea.deli· hip, begin~ng with
1923, and even with the March days of 1921. The
Left Oppositio~ in a number of documents and
theoretical works, has given its evaluation of all
the stages of the unfortunate officio.I policy of the
Comintern. This criticism mu t become the property of the Party. To avoid it or to be silent
about it will not be po sible. The Party will not
ri e to the height of its great ta k if it does not
freely evaluate its present in the light of it past.
If the Communist Party, in spite of the
exceptionally favorable cicumstances, ha proved
powerle seriou ly to shake the strudure of the
social democracy with the a.id of the formula of
"social Fasci m," then real Fascism now threatens
this structure, no longer with wordy formulre of
socalled radicalism, but with the chemical formulie
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of explosives.

No matter how true it is that the
social democracy by its whole policy prepared the
blo oming of Fasci m, it is no less true that Fasci m comes fo a.rd a a dea.dly threat p imarily
to that same social democracy all of who e magnificence is inextricably bound with parliamentarydemocratic-pacifist forms and methods of government.
There can be no doubt that at the crucial
moment the leaders of the social democracy and a
thin layer of labor aristocrats will prefer the triumph of Fasci m to the revolutionary dictator hip
of the proletariat. It is precisely the approach of
uch a choice that create exceptional difficulties
for the ocial democratic leaders among their own
worker . The policy of a united front of the worker againt Fa ci m flow from thi ituation. It
opens up tremendous po sibilities to the Communi t Party. A condition for ucc s, however is
the i·ejection of the theory and practi e of " ocial
Fa ci m," the harm of which becomes a positive
menace under he pre ent circum ta.nee .
The social crisis will inevitably produce deep
c1ea age within the social democmcy. The radicalization of the masse will affect the ocial democrat . We will inevitably have to make agreements with the various social democratic organization and faction again t Fa cism, putting de.finite
condition to the leaders, in thi connection, before
the eye of the mas e . Only frightened opportuni t , ye terday' alli of Purcell and Cook, of Chiang
Kai- hek and Wang Chin Wei, can bind themselves
beforehand by formal obligations against uch
agreements. We mu t return from the empty official's phra e about the united front to the policy
of the united front as it wa formulated by Lenin
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and alway applied by the Bolsheviks in 191'7.
5. The problem of unemployment is one
of the most important element of the political
crisis. The struggle against capitalist rationalizcation and for the seven hou:r working day remains
entirely on the order of th d1).y. But only
the slogan of an extensive, planned collaboration
with the oviet Union can raise this struggle to
the height of the revolutionary ta ks. In the programmatic declaration for the election, the Central Committee of the German Party states that
after achievim.g power the Communists will e tablish
economic collaboration with the Soviet Union.
There i no doubt of thi . But a histo:rical perspective cannot be set up against the political tasks
of the day. The orker , and the u employed in
the first place, must be mobilized right now under
the logan of extensive economic collaboration with
the oviet republic. The State Planning Commission of the Union of Socialist ovi t Republics
should work out a plan of economic collaboration
with the participation of the German Communis s
and trade unionists, which, using the pre ent unemployment as it point of departure, is developed
into an all-sided collaboration embracing all the
basic branche of economy. The problem do not
lie in promising to reconstruct economy after the
eizure of power; it lies in eizing power. The problem is not to promise the collaboration of Soviet
Germany with the U. . . R. but to win the working ma se for thi collaboration today, connecting
it closely with the crisis and unemployment, and
developing it further on in a gigantic plan for the
socialist reconstruction of both countries.
6. The political c:ris1s in Germany brings
into question the Versailles regime in urope. The
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Central Committee of the Germa.n Communist Party
declares that, having taken power, the German proletariat will liquidate the Ver aille documents. Is
that all? The abolition of the Versa.ill Treaty
a the highe t achie ement of the proletarian revolution! What is to be put in it place? There is
not a word about this. Such a negative way of
putting the que tion brings the Party clo e to the
ational ociali ts [Fa c· ts]. The Suoiet United
States of Europe- that is the only correct slogan
which points the way out of the dismemberment of
Europe, which threatens not only Germany but
the whole continent with complete economic and
cultural decline.
The slogan of the proletarian unification of
Europe is at the same time a very important eapon in the truggle again t the abomination of
Fa ci t chauvini m, the baiting of France, and so
forth.
The most incorrect, the mo t dangerous
policy is that of pas ive adaptation to the enemy
by painting oneself to look like him. The logan
of national madne mu t be oppo ~d by the slogans
of international liberation. For thi , the Party
must be purged of national socialism, the principal
element of which i the theory of ociali m in one
country.
We have examined the question of the tactical turn in the Communist International exclusively
in the light of the German situation because, in
the first place, the German crisi now put the
German Communist Party once more in the center
of attention of the world proletarian vanguard, and
because in the light of thi crisis all the problems
are brought out in sharpest relief. It would not
be difficult, however, to show that what has been
said here also holds good, to one degree or another,
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for other countrie .
In France, all the form of class struggle
after the war bear an immeasurably less sharp and
less decjsive character than they do in Germany.
But the general tendencies of develo'Dment are the
ame, not to speak of the direct dependence of the
fate of France upon the fate of Germany. At any
rate, the t\ll"ll.S of tbe Communist lnter;iational
have a univer al character. The French · Communi t Party which was declared by Molotov back in
1928 to be the first candidate for power, ha conducted an ab olutely uicidal policy in the la t two
~ ears.
It e pecially overlooked the economic cri~s.
The tactical turn as proclaimed in France at the
very moment when th crisis began to take the place
of the industrial revival. In this way, the ame contradictions difficulties and tasks about which we
speak in reference to Germany, are on the order of
the day in France a well.
The turn in the C. I., combined with the
turn in the ituation, put new and eYceptionally
important tasks before the Left Communi t Opposition. Its force are not big. But every current
grows together with the growth of its ta ks. T o
under tand them clearly is to pos ess one of the
most important guarantee of victo'I'y.

Prinkipo, September 26, 1980.
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